organizations, and to private businesses. Planners now lend their technical and discursive abilities to a broader range of actors beyond the state.
The shifts in relationships between state, civil society, and capital that have revived debates on citizenship also have important implications for planning praxis. The questions before us in this chapter are: How do planning theory and practice articulate with the project of citizenship? How does planning respond to the shifting conceptualization of citizenship and state-citizen relations? The chapter traces the shifts in conceptualizations of citizenship and the relevant shifts in the conceptualization of planning, particularly progressive planning.
I argue that the goals and objectives of planning practice are complicated by their formulation on a contested terrain of citizenship. As progressive planning aims to achieve a just society (see Fainstein 2010) , it is essential for it to engage with the expanded focus of the citizenship debate, from formal rights to justice and from representative to participatory democracy.
That engagement should lead progressive planners to recognize and reflect on certain nuanced differences between participatory planning and insurgent planning. Whereas participatory planning enlists citizens to participate in decisions through professional planners and formalized, often bureaucratized, structures of participation, "insurgent" planning occurs when citizens act directly through self-determined oppositional practices that constitute and claim urban spaces. Insurgent planning is a contested field of interaction among multiple actors including, but not confined to, professional planners, who determine the arenas of action to address the specific forms of oppression.
Citizenship Debates
Cities and citizenship are intricately connected. For the ancient Greeks and Romans, citizens were privileged free men who lived in the protected city; subjects were slaves who worked the land outside the city and its forts. The city protected citizens against aggressors and the 3 wars that took defeated populations as slaves. City citizenship then was a marker of privileged membership in a political community, the polis.
Ever since the classical period, the privileges associated with citizenship have been the subject of important political and philosophical debates. These fiercely contested debates have sought to (re)define the meanings and privileges attached to citizenship both in theory and in practice. The contemporary debate on citizenship engages with the liberal democratic notions shaped during the modern era to transform historical social hierarchies. The eighteenth-century revolutions, in particular the French Revolution, mark an important point of departure for the ensuing citizenship debates in Western liberal democracies. The motto "Liberty, equality, fraternity" for all asserted a universal but individualized ideal of citizenship. Societies were to be ruled not by allegiance to kings and feudal lords but by social contracts that sovereign and rational citizens made, exchanging individual freedom to a state in exchange for representation and equal treatment before the law (Rousseau 1762 (Rousseau / 1968 ). This modern construction of citizenship as a social contract that mediates between individual citizens and the state departs in important ways from the earlier notions. It is the nation, as opposed to the city, that defines citizens' privileged membership in a political community whose populace is ruled as equals with political rights and duties.
The modern era's notion of citizenship canceled the old hierarchies that subordinated subjects to citizens; yet it created new social hierarchies that draw much of the contemporary critique of liberal citizenship. Perhaps the best summary of the principles that guide liberal democratic citizenship is carried out by T. H. Marshall. In his often-quoted essay on citizenship and social class, he defines citizenship as "a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed" (1950/1977, 92) . He divides citizenship rights into three categories of civil, political, and social rights, which he describes as arising in sequence 4 from the eighteenth to the nineteenth to the twentieth century. The eighteenth century was preoccupied with citizens' civil rights and with creating courts that guarantee those rights, making all men equal before the law. All individual members of a national community were equally protected and punished before the law. The main preoccupation of the nineteenth century was with citizens' political rights and the establishment of the parliament and other representative structures where, by virtue of political membership in a nation-state, all were to enjoy representation, to elect and be elected. The right of representation that marks most of the citizenship debates and struggles of the nineteenth century constructed the representative practices and institutions in place today in the Western liberal democratic societies. The twentieth century's principal gain, Marshall argues, was citizens' social rights as embodied in welfare policies and as guaranteed by state welfare agencies that protect citizens from economic uncertainties. In Marshall's view, citizens use their universal civil and political rights and the legal and representative structures set in place during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to achieve social rights that address their basic socioeconomic needs. In this liberal formulation of citizenship, above, citizenship is a set of universal rights for citizens that have developed in progression from civil to political to social. As such, citizenship operates through a democratic social contract by which the state grants and guarantees rights to citizens, and citizens agree to a set of duties and obligations.
These important principles of citizenship as constituted through a liberal democratic social contract have been critically examined by much of the contemporary social science literature. Sociologists like Giddens (1982) critiqued the evolutionary account of citizenship rights as cumulative, developing in an almost linear progression where one form of rights led to the next (also see Friedmann 2002) . Moreover, critics assert, assuming social rights to be an outcome of representative politics conceals the class interests of the bourgeoisie in stabilizing capitalism through its welfare policies (Mann 1987) , as well as the larger social movements beyond representative politics. It is pointed out that the social rights achieved in the twentieth century were the outcome of larger union struggles and socialist movements, not merely of political citizenship and representative politics (Turner 1990) . Bryan Turner's analysis of citizenship coming from above and from below pushed the critique of liberal citizenship further by pointing out its top-down and formal bias (Turner 1990) . Articulating different forms of citizenship emerging from above and below and through the public or the private sphere, he points out that liberal democratic conceptualizations capture only the processes that take place from above and through public realms.
Feminists have mounted fierce critiques of a formal, state-centered and top-down understanding of citizenship (Lister 1997; Yuval-Davis 1997) . They uncover the hollowness of the modern era's promise of inclusion and universal political rights when women are excluded from formal structures of political representation. Moreover, feminist scholars and political theorists have redefined the arena of politics, expanding it from the formal parliaments and representative structures dominated by men to include women's informal political activism in neighborhoods and residential communities (Jelin 1990; Staheli and Cope 1994; Kaplan 1997; Tripp 1998; Hassiem 1999; McEwan 2000; Miraftab 2006 ).
Stressing the plurality of forms of politics, feminists argue that the formalist notions of politics and political citizenship by default render women's citizenship invisible. Articulating the notion of informal politics as an equally important realm where citizens negotiate their rights vis-à-vis the state, feminists have made important inroads in the citizenship debate, opening it to alternative interpretations.
Decentering the State in Citizenship Debates
In the last three decades, the debate about citizenship has been reinvigorated. Since the late 1980s, the global restructuring of capitalism and the emergence of neoliberal modes of governance have privatized social risk-undermining the responsibilities of the state for 6 public well-being in favor of the free market and a shift of that burden to the citizens. inscriptions of rights by state institutions and laws are necessary and can facilitate the citizens' struggle, but in and of themselves those are insufficient to ensure rights in practice;
they cannot be materialized without citizens' practices on the ground. Accounting for the complexity of entangled formal and informal processes results in a nuanced analysis revealing the range of agents beyond the state who act to achieve the civil, political, and socioeconomic rights promised to citizens. Such an alternative, inclusive perspective views citizenship not as an object such as a bundle of laws or decrees but as a process constructed both as a process from above through legal and institutional arms of the state and from below through citizens' everyday actions both formal and informal. Citizenship is articulated as practices that generate "new sources of laws" (Holston and Appadurai 1999, 20) .
Citizenship from Below
To better understand this emerging notion of citizenship as practices grounded in civil society, I offer two observations from the field: one from the Western Cape, South Africa, 8 and the other from the Midwest of the United States. Elsewhere (Miraftab 2006 (Miraftab , 2009 , I have published a detailed case study of South Africa's Western Cape Anti Eviction Campaign (AEC), a grassroots movement that resists the eviction orders of the local state and private banks so as to help the poor to keep the roofs over their heads. The AEC also asserts poor residents' rights to basic urban services by reconnecting those that the municipal government or private sector disconnects for nonpayment. The AEC practices expose the hypocrisy of the post-Apartheid state in granting constitutional rights to shelter and basic services, yet issuing eviction orders to those unable to pay for rent or utilities. It is important to recognize how this contradiction reflects the country's larger paradox, whereby its political liberation led to its neoliberal economic transformation (Miraftab 2008) . In the country's political liberation, the 1996 constitution granted citizens universal civil, political, and socioeconomic rights; at the same time, the adoption by the state of the neoliberal Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy privileged the private sector's growth over equity and realignment of the skewed property ownership patterns wrought by Apartheid. As a result, many South African citizens were left unable to enact their constitutionally inscribed rights to shelter and basic services. Their constraint this time is accomplished not through racial categorization but because the contemporary free-market economy has marginalized them economically.
The AEC case study, however, reveals not only the inadequacy and unwillingness of the state to deliver on the constitution's promise of universal post-Apartheid citizenship but also the potent capacity of the poor and their organizations to feed, to dress, to shelter, to make their voices heard-in short, to participate in governing their lives, communities, and 
Citizenship Rights and Justice
An important question for planning scholarship in the emerging debates on citizenship concerns the relationship between rights and justice, and specifically the caveat not to conflate the two. Rawls's theory of justice as fairness (1971), which builds on the liberal notions of the social contract, helped planning scholarship to recognize how equal rights and equal treatment of unequal citizens are not fair and do not lead to a just outcome. While urban dwellers may have equal rights to choose their residential locations, spatial inequalities persist-a recognition that prompts not only the state's redistributive policies but also several streams within a progressive planning movement, including advocates of equity planning (Krumholz 1994; Krumholz and Forester 1990) and guerrillas in the bureaucracy (Needleman and Needleman 1974) . Feminist scholars of citizenship and political philosophy like Iris Young (1990) have further deconstructed the assumed unity of rights and justice. The project of justice, Young argues, is broader than individualized rights and fair treatment. To reach a just outcome we need to recognize self-determined and group-based forms of oppression. The mantra of "no redistribution without recognition" highlights the failure of welfare policies that may satisfy beneficiaries' rights as individuals yet through stigma oppress them as a group. Recognition of group-based differences has been most influential in the progressive planning debates on multicultural cities (Sandercock 1998a (Sandercock , 2003 Milroy 1992; Harwood 2005) .
Such understanding of justice as encompassing more than abstract universal rights has shifted the core attention of the citizenship debate and practice from representation to selfdetermination. Disentangling abstract rights and substantive justice focuses on the value of citizens' self-determined experiences of oppression and justice, and hence validates their direct action. That change in perspective ultimately privileges participatory democracy over representative democracy.
In current debates about citizenship, direct participation and control are framed as insurgent citizenship. The term, coined by Holston (1998) and introduced to planning scholarship by Sandercock's insurgent historiographies (1998b) , sheds light on the spatial struggles and practices of those that the false promises of universal citizenship exclude.
Whether among "minoritized" populations of the Global North or marginalized residents of the Global South, insurgent citizenship refers to democratic practices where citizens do not relegate the defense of their interests to others-be they politicians, bureaucrats, or planners-but take the matter into their own hands. Through insurgent citizenship practices, grassroots groups assert their right to the city and take control of the necessities for decent life. Insurgent citizenship practices do not excuse the state from its responsibilities; rather, they hold the state accountable through means beyond the state-sanctioned channels of citizen participation. The practice of insurgent citizenship is not confined to invited spaces of citizenship such as the Senate, the municipal councils, the planning commission's community hearings, citizen review boards, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Such citizenship practices occur as well in self-determined invented spaces where citizens participate through direct action, often with oppositional practices that respond to specific contexts and issues (Miraftab 2006 (Miraftab , 2009 Grassroots actions that do not stop at the limits of formal rights but go beyond them to make decisions and act across invented and invited spaces of citizenship are insurgent practices of citizenship (see Miraftab 2006 ).
This claiming of rights, as Mark Prucell (2003) explains, should be understood not in the limited formal and legalist sense but in the radical Lefebvrian sense of the right to appropriate (and therefore to use) and the right to participate (and therefore to produce) urban space. From this perspective, the urban landscapes of most cities of the Global South are indeed the material and spatial evidence of citizens' asserting their right to the city-not simply through legal means and bureaucratic channels but also through insurgent practices by which people produce their shelter, appropriate urban spaces, and use the city to secure a livelihood.
In curious ways, as Holston (2008) points out, the insurgent practices of favela residents and squatters once again uphold the city, not the nation, as the political community to which citizens claim membership in and assert their rights to. Residents of squatter settlements, favelas, and townships take charge of urban spaces. They make their own living space and livelihood not because of but often despite the state's institutions and laws. The insurgent citizenship practices of such subordinate groups offer an alternative challenging the assumption that the state is "the only legitimate source of citizenship rights" (Holston 1998, 39 ).
In the social contract that governs liberal democratic societies, citizens as individuals delegate their rights to others-political representatives, bureaucrats, and/or technical experts-to act in their best interests. In contrast, disadvantaged and marginalized citizens who recognize the inadequacy of formal rights turn to direct participation to achieve justice.
14 They do not hand the advocacy of their interests to others but, rather, directly take part in decisions that affect their lives and shape binding decisions. have become the employers of professional planners (Douglass and Friedmann 1998) .
Consulting firms and corporations set the agendas for urban and regional development decisions, as do the NGOs and nonprofit groups that try to create alternative plans and proposals to bridge the gap left by the state's restructured activities. Today, multiple actors set the agenda for and define the meaning of professional planners' practices. The state is no longer the sole legitimating source for planners' activities.
Second, this move away from a state-centered bureaucratic enterprise has expanded the definition of planning. As the private sector and civil society organizations and their members have taken over many of the public sector's responsibilities, the plurality of planning protagonists has made planning, more fiercely than ever before, a site for contestation by actors with contrasting interests and commitments. Now, not only the actions and decisions by powerful corporate interests or affluent hometown associations but also the actions undertaken by disenfranchised and marginalized communities are visible and legitimated as de facto planning. Planning as an exclusive activity undertaken by formally trained and professionalized planners is increasingly questioned not only in theory but also on the ground through the social and spatial production of cities, neighborhoods, and urban livelihoods that occurs through direct grassroots action.
The examples described earlier in this chapter may illuminate these points. In the Midwestern rural town we discussed, for instance, there were no professional planners or planning agencies, nor was there any formal political structure that represented the interests of the minorities and immigrants independent of their citizenship status as naturalized, documented, or undocumented. Nevertheless, the socioeconomic gains of the town's minority, foreign-born residents were evident, and they arose from the group's everyday practices to assert their right to the city and a dignified livelihood-not from the state's Reflecting on decades of participatory planning and the failure of both the liberal democratic notion of citizenship and its representative channels to deliver on the promise of justice, many planning scholars stress the need for citizens ' direct action (e.g., Freidmann 1988; Beard 2003; Sandercock 1998b; Irazabal 2008; Leavitt 1994; Miraftab 2009 ).
Progressive planning increasingly recognizes the need to move beyond the confines of formal rights as the project of justice. Such a move brings planning to encompass a range of insurgent practices of citizenship that occur outside the formal structures of representation by disenfranchised citizens. This is planning that values direct and self-determined spaces of action and does not confuse representation and participation. Progressive planning in the twenty-first century needs to move beyond participatory planning to recognize, nourish, and promote an expanded and insurgent notion of planning. It is this turn that is pregnant with possibilities for an expanded and more just understanding of planning, both as an ideal and as a realm of action.
Conclusion
Planning, a field that is so closely linked to the construction of the modern state, reflects the contested terrain of citizenship. As a profession, planning has been a creation of the modern state and is deeply shaped by the core liberal democratic values of representative democracy as beacon for freedom and equality. In this chapter tracing the debates on citizenship as theory and practice that mediate the relationship between the state and citizens, I have highlighted the crisis of the liberal social contract as the fallacy of its promises of equality and freedom are increasingly exposed. We have seen marginalized communities increasingly take the realization of their rights and the fulfillment of their needs into their own hands through social movements and insurgent practices of citizenship. They do not necessarily consign the production, use, and control of urban space to others, be it politicians, bureaucrats, or planners, but take charge and through direct action appropriate the city and its resources.
In the 1970s and '80s, the emphasis on negotiation and collaboration among multiple actors brought to the center of the planning profession a new set of methodologies and understandings that marked a participatory turn in both planning scholarship and practice. A few decades into this participatory and inclusive turn in planning, we need to critically engage its core guiding values and methodologies. In the twenty-first century, just as the understanding of citizenship has shifted from a formalist top-down decree to a set of practices grounded in civil society, so has the understanding of planning as a set of state-sponsored activities changed to acknowledge a set of practices undertaken by multiple and contesting actors.
Progressive planning in the twenty-first century needs to engage with a more nuanced understanding of rights and justice and a clearer perspective on the fundamentally distinctive principles of representative and participatory democracy. These insights highlight the need to recognize, value, and nourish citizens' insurgent practices that may fall outside or even against formal or state-sanctioned participatory channels.
As structural and institutional forces seek to stabilize oppressive relationships through inclusion, progressive planning in the twenty-first century has the moral obligation to critically reflect on methodology by which the state is decentered and its citizens are included in both citizenship and planning. If it is to promote social transformation, progressive planning's imperative must be to move beyond a misconceived celebration simply of inclusion to a conceptualization of insurgent planning. Insurgent planning practices pierce the veneer of participation and inclusion to pursue substantive forms of justice.
